The introduction of THAAD in South Korea is not appropriate considering the geographical and technological incompatibility, diplomatic issues with neighboring countries, and issues of national defense sovereignty. Other defense systems should be considered as alternatives.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is an “endgame high altitude area defense system,” a defense weapon system that directly shoots down incoming missiles in the final stage. It was developed by the U.S. Army as part of the U.S.-led Missile Defense. In addition, the embedded TPY-2 X-band radar detects targets and is responsible for interception in the final situation when the warhead falls using the hit-to-kill method. Discussions on the introduction of THAAD to South Korea began in 2011 between the USFK and the Ministry of National Defense, and in May 2014, US Joint Chiefs of Staff Vice Chairman James Winfield announced that the US was considering deploying THAAD to South Korea for the purpose of defending against North Korean provocations. Then, in July 2023, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken also hinted at the possibility of THAAD being included in the missile defense system for the Korean Peninsula in a Twitter interview. However, the South Korean government has not taken a clear position due to many controversies, including strong opposition from China and Russia. The South Korean government has taken an ambiguous stance in the past, saying that 1) it has no plans to introduce THAAD, 2) THAAD would be helpful if it were to be introduced, and 3) it does not oppose the USFK’s introduction of THAAD with its own budget. Under these circumstances, the South Korean government should oppose the introduction of THAAD for the following reasons.
First, the introduction of THAAD in South Korea is geographically and technically inappropriate. The official purpose of THAAD is to defend against North Korea’s missile provocations. However, North Korea can easily shoot down short-range missiles when it attacks Korea. Missiles go through three phases after launch: boost phase, mid-course phase, and terminal phase. THAAD can only defend against missiles in the terminal phase. In addition, THAAD is difficult to intercept at altitudes of 40 km or less. However, the trajectory of a ballistic missile fired from North Korea to Korea is lower than the minimum interception altitude of THAAD due to its short range. For example, even if THAAD is introduced as a defense system against North Korea’s attack on Japan or Guam, the trajectory of the ballistic missile fired by North Korea will already be at an altitude of 700 km or higher when it passes over South Korea, which is beyond the range of THAAD. In addition, THAAD is not perfect because it is an interceptor system that has been mass-produced since 2005, which is relatively recent. Lockheed Martin, the company that developed THAAD, has disclosed the high hit rate of THAAD, but this was achieved in optimal conditions and is very different from actual situations, so its reliability can be questioned. Lockheed Martin has not disclosed the actual THAAD warhead interception rate. In the case of the Gulf War, the US military was unable to prevent Iraq from launching ballistic missiles, and if North Korea attacks Korea, it is likely to use a larger number of missiles than during the Gulf War. Therefore, the technical and geographical limitations of THAAD are clear.
Second, the introduction of THAAD to Korea could be seen as a threat to the countries of Northeast Asia. The X-band detection radar of THAAD has a detection range of about 1,000 km, which can detect the Shandong Peninsula, Shanghai, and Beijing in China. In addition to the radar, THAAD is a high-altitude defense system with an interception altitude of 150 km, which can intercept targets as far as Okinawa and Guam. This could open the possibility of the US military invading neighboring countries, which is why neighboring countries have taken a negative stance on THAAD’s deployment in South Korea. On March 16, Liu Jianchao, deputy chief of staff of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, expressed opposition to THAAD’s deployment in South Korea and strongly responded that he would sever diplomatic relations with South Korea the moment THAAD was deployed. If diplomatic relations with China, Korea’s major export destination, are severed, an economic blow is expected. Russia is also strongly opposed, and if THAAD is introduced, the cooperative system with Russia is likely to collapse. This could have a major impact on the development of the defense industry, which Korea relies on for its defense needs. In addition, the introduction of THAAD also poses a threat to Korea’s national defense sovereignty. If THAAD is deployed in Korea, it means that the missile defense system of the USFK and the Korean missile defense system will be integrated. This could result in the transfer of Korea’s national defense sovereignty to the USFK.
Third, the introduction of THAAD deepens military dependence on the United States. Some people have suggested that THAAD should be introduced because of its excellent interception capability and the threat it poses, but THAAD is not the only military alternative that can perform interception and defense missions. Korea has developed the Patriot, a low-altitude, short-range interceptor ballistic missile, and Israel has developed the Arrow, an upper-tier defense interceptor ballistic missile like THAAD. The Aegis has been deployed since the early 2000s and has shown excellent accuracy and interception rates through continuous improvements. It is also considered the most suitable weapon system for the Korean Missile Defense System (KAMD). These alternatives can also be used as weapons against neighboring countries and can fully achieve Korea’s defense purposes. The introduction of THAAD will only deepen military dependence on the United States.
The introduction of THAAD by the USFK is an unreasonable demand that ignores the political and diplomatic situation in Korea and the geographical and technical limitations of THAAD itself. If THAAD is introduced, the political damage caused by the checks and balances of neighboring countries will be significant. The Korean government maintains a policy of strategic ambiguity and the 3NO (No Request, No Consultation, No Decision) policy regarding the installation of THAAD by the USFK. The decision to introduce THAAD is difficult, but considering the various diplomatic relations and whether it is beneficial for practical defense, the introduction of THAAD in Korea is not appropriate.
