In this blog post, we will examine the role of the media’s watchdog function in a democratic society and the extent to which its freedom should be protected.
The media’s role in monitoring and criticizing the abuse of political power and social corruption plays an important role in a democratic society and has been recognized as an essential condition for the formation of sound public opinion and the fulfillment of the people’s right to know. The media is referred to as the “fourth branch” of government and is considered to play an important role in checking and balancing the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. The role of the press goes beyond simply providing information to the public; it plays an important role in preventing the concentration and abuse of power and strengthening transparency and accountability.
In the United States, the press’s watchdog function is recognized as constitutionally guaranteed. This watchdog function emphasizes the role of the media and has a meaning that goes beyond the freedom of expression of individuals. In other words, it has the characteristics of institutional rights granted to media organizations rather than the characteristics of individual fundamental rights. This role of the media raises awareness of various social issues and helps the public to correctly understand and evaluate power.
If the watchdog function is a constitutionally guaranteed right, what is its basis? The traditional American view on this issue is based on an active interpretation of the meaning of the First Amendment to the Constitution, which was enacted in 1791. This provision, which guarantees freedom of the press, stipulates that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. In this context, the press plays an important role in ensuring transparency in government activities and helping the public to understand information about the government. This is considered essential for preventing the abuse of power and realizing social justice in a democratic society.
According to this view, critical articles about the government were freely published in newspapers around the time of independence, indicating that a critical media ideology already existed. Based on this, it is recognized that the First Amendment to the Constitution could be naturally applied to media organizations in the future. This view finds the core function of media organizations in their role as a check on power. Therefore, even if there are commercial abuses of the press, they are less harmful than the abuse of state power, and so the watchdog function must be protected. This view leads to the argument that even if the press is at risk of being distorted by commercial interests, its function must be protected as an element necessary for the healthy development of a democratic society as a whole.
To this end, they argue that media regulation should be kept to a minimum and that, in the public interest, defamation through reporting should not even be considered a crime. They also suggest that policy considerations such as strengthening access to state institutions are necessary to enable the media to perform its watchdog function more actively.
However, this view has been criticized for overly broad interpretation of constitutional provisions and lack of concrete evidence to support it. No matter how important the role of the press is, the argument that its function must be absolutely protected can be controversial. In fact, some point out that if freedom of the press is guaranteed without restriction, it may actually infringe on other social values and individual rights.
American media law scholar Gleason presents a different perspective from the traditional view in his analysis of defamation lawsuits that occurred in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He states that the court’s recognition of the media’s watchdog function as a constitutional right of media organizations is directly linked to the court’s recognition of the special nature of the media’s reporting process. At the end of the 19th century, the media’s reporting practices were extremely sensationalist, and there were loud calls for social regulation. The number of defamation lawsuits skyrocketed, and the media was placed at a significant disadvantage due to the application of defamation laws that required truthful reporting.
At that time, the number of newspapers increased, and the newspaper industry grew significantly. Newspaper companies considered defamation lawsuits to be the most threatening factor to the newspaper industry. While actively responding to defamation lawsuits, they made various efforts to legislate their role as watchdogs as a privilege of immunity. Through these efforts, the press began to emphasize its role as a public institution with social responsibility, moving away from being a mere conveyor of information. These efforts broadened the courts’ recognition of the public function of the press, but did not affect the outcome of lawsuits. For example, in a defamation lawsuit that arose from an article criticizing city officials in 1896, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the watchdog role of the press but ruled that the article in question exceeded the scope of freedom of the press. The state Supreme Court recognized that the watchdog role of newspapers could reveal the truth and elevate civic spirit. However, it emphasized that this could only be achieved through consistent and reasonable reporting and editing. In other words, the court took a positive view of the watchdog function of the press, but did not accept the press’s argument that the complexity of the reporting process was a justification for emphasizing truthful reporting. This trend in court rulings continued until the mid-20th century. Ultimately, according to Gleason, the basis for constitutional protection of the watchdog function can be found in the history of the development of defamation law.