In this blog post, I will examine why Augustine’s indicative view of language was criticized by Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and explore its philosophical significance.
I will criticize Augustine’s internal and indicative view of language through Wittgenstein’s arguments. To this end, I will first explain Augustine’s view of language as indicative and his divine illumination theory, which seeks to guarantee the certainty of knowledge through the human interior, based on the dichotomy of “inside and outside.” Then, I will interpret and critique this theory in my own way, utilizing the arguments presented in Wittgenstein’s later philosophical works. Finally, I will discuss how language functions.
The following is a quote from Augustine’s Confessions.
“When I saw them (my brother and sister) give names to objects and call them, and then run toward them, I realized that the objects were called by the sounds they made when they pointed to them. (Omitted) Therefore, by repeatedly hearing words used in different sentences in their appropriate places, I gradually came to know what they referred to, and after practicing pronouncing these words with my mouth, I was able to use them to express what I wanted.” (Confessions I. 8. 13)
In this passage from Confessions, the phrase “I realized that the object was called by the sound made while pointing at it” clearly shows that Augustine’s view of language was basically “indexical.” A referential view of language is a view in which the meaning of a word is understood as the object that the word refers to. According to this view, the meanings of the words “eat” and “walk” can be understood by the act of eating and the object being walked, respectively. However, this raises several questions. For example, how should the noun phrases “walking normally” and “walking quickly” be defined? According to the indexical view of language, these can be defined by pointing to the object being walked and saying, “That is walking normally” or “That is walking quickly.” However, these definitions are ambiguous. Even though it is the same act of walking, at what speed is it considered “normal walking,” and how much faster does one have to walk to be considered “walking quickly”? To resolve this issue, must we define the exact speed for “walking normally” and “walking quickly”? And does meaning arise based on that speed? However, this logic leads to the conclusion that even if a child walks quickly, if the speed does not meet the standard, then the child is not walking quickly.
From this, we can see that defining objects by pointing to them oversimplifies the function of language. Simply pointing to external objects cannot explain the wide range of uses of language. So, what answer does Augustine, who based his view of language on the referential theory, offer to this problem?
Augustine believes that the cause of this problem lies in viewing language as only external use. From his perspective, the true definition or meaning of language cannot be established by merely indicating external objects, i.e., objects that are visible to the eye. This is because we cannot define “walking normally” and “walking quickly” by indicating external objects. Augustine acknowledges this point. The world outside humans is uncertain. Knowledge obtained from the uncertain external world, that is, knowledge obtained by referring to external objects, cannot be true knowledge. This is because knowledge must be firm and unchanging. Then, where is true knowledge?
Augustine explains this by contrasting the external and internal worlds of humans. If the external world cannot provide knowledge because it is uncertain, then the internal world can provide true knowledge because it is certain. In the “walking” debate mentioned earlier, the external world seems to be uncertain. However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the internal world is certain. On what basis does Augustine make this claim? He bases his argument on the theory of divine illumination. The theory of divine illumination explains that knowledge of necessary and unchanging objects is acquired through the activity of intellectual light that illuminates those objects internally. And this intellectual light is based on God. In other words, God is the ultimate basis that enables human intellectual activity. Since God is a necessary being, the light that God shines enables humans to engage in intellectual activities related to necessary knowledge. Therefore, unlike external knowledge, knowledge within humans can provide firm and unchanging knowledge.
In conclusion, the distinction between “walking normally” and “walking quickly” is given meaning through the activity of light originating from God within, rather than from outside. For example, the standard for distinguishing between the two is formed by internally directing the images that arise within, that is, the images of “walking normally” and “walking quickly.” These images are made possible by God’s illumination.
Through the discussion so far, we can confirm that Augustine’s dichotomy between the external and the internal is linked to his view of internal language. Furthermore, through this view of internal language, we can see that words in language are still based on an indexical view of language, in which words refer to their referents (according to Augustine, internal mental referents). Furthermore, we can confirm that intellectual activity through language ultimately becomes internal mental activity, or in other words, the activity of light originating from God. As can be seen in Augustine’s answer to the “walking” argument, this activity of light makes it possible to refer to images and representations within the human mind, thereby enabling the creation of meaning. In other words, the meaning of language is made possible by pointing to internal representations.
However, I would like to criticize Augustine’s claim about the certainty of human internal knowledge through Wittgenstein’s argument. For example, suppose that Chul-soo is standing on a train platform. Chul-soo does not remember when the train will arrive, so he recalls the train schedule he saw at the ticket office. He remembers the schedule he saw at the ticket office in his mind and thinks that the train will arrive at 7:30. According to Augustine, Chul-soo’s representation is knowledge obtained through internal representation. However, where does the certainty of the knowledge that the train arrives at 7:30 come from? The certainty of knowledge is a long-standing debate. In this discussion, I will focus on how certainty of knowledge is obtained rather than how it is possible. In order to obtain the certainty of knowledge that the train arrives at 7:30, Chul-soo repeatedly recalls the timetable. However, when 7:30 arrives and the train does not come, Chul-soo goes back to the ticket office to check the timetable. As it turns out, the train Chul-soo is waiting for actually arrives at 7:50. The important point here is that Chul-soo’s knowledge was corrected by checking the external train timetable, not by repeatedly recalling his memory.
This example shows that the certainty of knowledge cannot be guaranteed by humans alone. I argue that the certainty of knowledge can be guaranteed not only by external factors, but also through the interaction between internal and external factors. Augustine believed that meaning is formed and language is concretized through the light that comes from God within humans, but I believe that interaction with the external world is necessary to guarantee the certainty of knowledge.
Therefore, human knowledge must be guaranteed through interaction with the external world. The formation of meaning also occurs through interaction with the external world, and language is also concretized through such interaction. In other words, human knowledge and language are constantly reconstructed and established through interaction with the external world. Augustine’s view of internal language can be criticized in this regard.
