In this blog post, we will look at the ethics of the two thinkers, focusing on their views on moral good and evil, how they evaluated human behavior, and the philosophical limitations and ways to overcome them.

 

Petrus Abaelardus’ concept of good and evil

Petrus Abaelardus acknowledges that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipotent. So how does he explain the “evil” we actually encounter? He first acknowledges the “presence of evil” that is prevalent in our society. Petrus explains the concept of good and evil in two ways. The first means “good or evil itself as a thing,” and the second means “a situation in which evil or good exists.” He argues that “the existence of evil itself” cannot always be said to be “evil.” Take the example of a poor man. There was a poor man. He worked hard to escape poverty and succeeded, becoming rich. He then used the money he earned to help the poor and started a charity. In this example, “poverty” exists as evil, but a “situation in which good exists,” namely the “start of a charity,” has occurred. In other words, the “existence of evil itself,” that is, “poverty,” cannot be judged as “evil.”
So, can evil be seen as a force that limits the front of God? Petrus says no. The evil in the world we see also converges into good in the world God sees. An example of this is how the evil of this world, poverty, has been transformed into the good of charity. In other words, humans are ignorant, so they see it as evil right now, but in the divine dimension, it also converges into good. However, because we are ignorant, we cannot know when and how evil will be realized as good. Therefore, we must simply believe that God will realize it as good. This raises a question: If we do something, it will always be realized as good on the divine level, so does it make sense to think about whether the act is moral or not? However, Petrus believes that human moral acts still have meaning. He says that humans cannot know whether the act is good or evil, but they can know whether the act was done with good intentions or evil intentions. Petrus believed that moral and immoral acts can be distinguished through the intention of the act.

 

Thomas Aquinas’s concept of moral good and evil

Thomas Aquinas argued that since God created perfect good, our will always wants good. For example, a person commits murder, but he does not want evil, but the sensory pleasure that comes from the act of murder. He regards the sensual pleasure he desires as good. However, Thomas says that God gave humans free will, but did not want them to abuse it and sin. In other words, it is not a tendency given by God for humans to choose evil. However, it seems that human free will and the inability to choose evil are incompatible. So how would Thomas explain this? He argues that choosing evil means lacking freedom. Humans always want to do good, but because they have free will, they also have the possibility of choosing evil. In other words, there is a possibility of “wavering in the face of evil.” This state is dynamic, so humans are increasingly drawn to the evil side. Regardless of freedom, humans are drawn to the evil side. It is natural for the will to waver because it can lean toward both good and evil. Thomas emphasized “reason,” especially “right reason,” which exists one step above the will. According to his theory, actions occur through the joint action of will and reason, and actions are considered good or evil depending on how rational they are and how lacking in the order of reason. In other words, an act based on reason is considered a moral act, while an act based on irrational stimuli is considered an immoral act.

 

The Ethics of Petrus Abaelardus

Petrus Abaelardus viewed all acts as value-neutral. Then, what is the evil we are seeing? As mentioned earlier, the fact that evil exists does not necessarily mean that it is evil. Violence is “the existence of evil,” but it is not possible to value violence itself as evil. Also, because humans are ignorant, they cannot know whether their actions will lead to good. So, on what basis should we evaluate actions? Petrus says it is in the “intention.” This is because it is always possible to know whether the actor acted with good intentions or evil intentions. For example, a woman fell in love with a man. They got married, but it turned out that the man was her cousin. As a result, the woman had an incestuous marriage. In this case, according to Petrus, we cannot say that the act is evil. This is because the woman did not know anything and did not have evil intentions when she had an incestuous marriage. Here, we can see that intention is a state of mind related to “knowledge” (knowing and not knowing). Let’s take the example of violence again. Violence itself is value-neutral. However, if someone uses violence with the intention of causing injury to another person, the evaluation changes. An act is evil because it is committed with an evil intent to harm. On the other hand, if someone uses violence to save a boy who is being beaten by several people, the act is considered good because it is committed with a good intent. As such, good intent can justify an act that is otherwise prohibited. So, can evil intent ruin an act that is otherwise good? According to Petrus, this is the case. He emphasized intention, so the evaluation of an act depends on intention. For example, a judge sentences a criminal. This act itself is an act that exists as a good. However, if the judge did not sentence the criminal with the good intention of seeking justice, but with the evil intention of inflicting pain because the criminal was a friend who had been bothering him, this would ruin the good act. Petrus also believed that good intentions are as commendable as good deeds, even if the good intentions are not realized in action. For example, let’s say two people wanted to build a shelter to help the poor. However, one person was robbed the day before, and the other person built the shelter as planned. In this case, both people can be considered as equally good because they had good intentions. If so, then evil intentions should be condemned as much as evil acts. But why do humans punish acts rather than intentions? This is because humans are weak and therefore consider evil acts to be worse than evil intentions. However, Petrus argues for the theory of strict liability (the theory of consequences). This theory argues that punishment can be justified even if there is no criminal intent, and at first glance, it seems that Petrus values consequences more. But in reality, this is not the case. For example, let’s say a woman accidentally smothers a newborn baby while she is sleeping. However, this woman is not guilty of a crime because she did not know what she was doing (i.e. she did not have evil intentions to kill). However, Petrus says that the punishment for this woman can be justified. This is because it can serve as a warning to others to be more careful.

 

Petrus Abaelardus’s Ethics of Intentions: Limitations

Petrus Abaelardus said that intention is an important factor when evaluating the goodness or evil of an act. However, there are limitations to this claim. The first limitation is that a person can be exempted from guilt even if he has a false conscience. For example, a man believes that adultery is not a sin. So he commits adultery, and because he has a false conscience that adultery is not a sin, he cannot be said to have intended it. According to Petrus’s ethics, he can be exempted from guilt. However, this seems to be a loose valuation. The second limitation is that evil means can be justified as long as the intention is good. For example, let’s say you stole to help the poor. According to Petrus, the theft can be justified because there was a good intention to “help the poor.” However, this also seems loose in terms of evaluating actions. Next, I will look at the ethics of Thomas Aquinas and compare it with the ethics of Petrus Abaelardus. Then, I will see how Thomas Aquinas explains the limitations of Petrus Abaelardus.

 

Thomas Aquinas’s Ethics (Focusing on the Differences with Petrus Abaelardus)

Thomas Aquinas distinguished three types of human actions in terms of moral evaluation. The first is an action that can be evaluated as good. For example, a charitable act. The second is an action that can be evaluated as evil. For example, rape. The third is an action that is neither good nor evil. For example, taking a walk. This shows the difference between Petrus and the actions. Petrus viewed actions as value-neutral, while Thomas believed that actions could be evaluated as good or evil. According to Thomas, for an action to be considered morally good, it must satisfy three conditions. First, the action must fall within the category of non-evil actions. Second, the action must be performed in an appropriate situation. Third, it must be performed with virtuous intentions. If any of these three conditions are missing, the act becomes evil. While both believe that an act can only be considered good if both parties have good intentions, Thomas believes that more conditions are needed to be considered good than Petrus. Thomas also acknowledges that evil intentions can ruin good deeds. However, unlike Petrus, he believes that good intentions cannot make evil deeds good. For example, Petrus believes that stealing to help the poor cannot be considered evil because the act is done with good intentions. However, Thomas believes that stealing is an evil act that harms someone, so it cannot be considered good. This is because, regardless of the outcome, if the act itself is evil, it does not meet the first of Thomas’ three conditions. In addition, Thomas believed that an act should be performed in an appropriate situation. For example, let’s say there is a person who is in danger of dying, and the person watching him is only praying beside him instead of actually helping him. Praying to God is a good act, but it is difficult to evaluate it as good in the situation in which the person is in. Similarly, from the perspective of “practice,” Petrus and Thomas are different. Petrus believes that if one has good intentions, one should be evaluated the same even if the action is not carried out. On the other hand, Thomas believes that one is morally good not only if one has good intentions, but also if one carries out the action in an appropriate situation. However, he believes that one can be exempted from guilt for failing to carry out an action if the failure was not voluntary. In the case of the two people who wanted to build the detention facility mentioned earlier, one of them can be exempted from the crime of not building (not implementing) the detention facility because he was unlucky (i.e. he was not voluntary).
Next, I will examine Thomas’s claim about a guilty conscience. Thomas claims that we should follow our conscience even if it is a guilty conscience. However, he says that we are not always exempt from sin. If the wrongdoing is about a fact and we have not been negligent in finding out the fact, we can be exempt from sin. In other words, if a person has committed a certain action but was not ignorant of the fact that he or she should not have done so, the person cannot be held responsible for the consequences of the action. For example, let’s say a man has committed adultery without knowing that the woman is married. In this case, he can be absolved of guilt if he had made an effort to find out whether the woman was married. However, he cannot be absolved of guilt for breaking the sacred law. In other words, one cannot be exempted from guilt for avoidable “ignorance.” For example, let’s say a man commits rape because he believes that rape is not a sin. According to Petrus, the man can be exempted from guilt because he did not have evil intentions, but according to Thomas, his mistaken belief is a wrongdoing against divine law, so he cannot be exempted from guilt.
Thomas said that one should distinguish between foresight and intention. He said that foresight and intention are different, and sometimes unintended consequences can be foreseen. For example, let’s say there is a person who crosses fields to communicate. He knows that he may damage the fields, but he has no intention of doing so. He crossed the fields with evil intentions. However, it was foreseeable that the fields would be damaged, but not intentional. As such, there can be foreseeable consequences even if they are not intentional. However, in cases where an evil act produces an evil result, as in this example, it is pointless to distinguish between foreknowledge and intention. Rather, the evil result makes the evil act even worse. The only time foreknowledge and intention should be distinguished is when a good act produces a bad result. For example, consider a murder in self-defense. Two outcomes are foreseen through self-defense: the preservation of one’s life and the death of the attacker. Although there was a morally good intention to preserve one’s life, the attacker’s death was not intended. In such cases, the use of violence is permissible even though the death of the attacker was caused by an unintended consequence. On the other hand, if the killing was committed intentionally, it cannot be considered reasonable.

 

Comparison of the Ethics of Petrus Abaelardus and Thomas Aquinas

Let’s compare them based on intention, action, performance, and result. First, both of them considered intention to be important. They both emphasized that actions should be performed with good intentions. The difference is that Petrus sees the power of intention to be greater. He believed that actions can be evaluated as good as long as the intention is good. On the other hand, Thomas saw good intention as one of the factors for evaluating actions as good.
The two men have different opinions on the act. Petrus saw the act itself as value-neutral, and the value of the act depends on the intention. However, Thomas classified the act itself into three value-evaluative categories, and he saw good acts as factors for being evaluated as good.
In terms of performance, Petrus said that if one has good intentions, one deserves praise even if one does not perform. However, Thomas believed that even if one has good intentions, one can only be considered morally good if one performs in an appropriate situation. However, in the case of unintentional failure, one can be exempted from the guilt of not performing.
As for the consequences, Petrus believed that the goodness or wickedness of the act does not affect the consequences, but the consequences can justify punishment. On the other hand, Thomas believed that when an evil act produces an evil outcome, the outcome makes the act even more wicked, and when a good act produces a bad outcome, the intention and foresight must be distinguished. In addition, even if an evil act produces good results, it cannot be considered good because the act itself is evil.

 

How Thomas Aquinas’s ethics complements the limitations of Petrus Abaelardus’s ethics

There are two limitations in Petrus Abaelardus’s ethics. The first is that a person can be exempt from sin even if he or she has a bad conscience. Thomas explained this by distinguishing between two types of bad conscience. The first is a mistake about facts, and the second is a mistake about divine law. According to Thomas, a mistake about facts can be excused if the person was not negligent in discovering the facts. However, if this mistake becomes a habit and continues, the mistake about facts cannot be forgiven. A mistake about divine law cannot be excused. The second limitation is that Petrus’s ethics may seem to justify evil means if the end is good. Thomas argued that the value of the act itself is also important.
The third limitation is that the divine law is an “unknown” that can be avoided, and it is inherent in humans and can be judged by reason. In addition, he believed that an act cannot be considered morally good just because it is good in intention. A good act can only be considered morally good if it is performed at the right time and with good intentions. Thomas has supplemented the limitations of Petrus’ intention-based ethics by raising the standard of “moral goodness” higher than that of Petrus.