In this blog post, we will examine how the policies—promoted as part of the 4th Investment Revitalization Measures—regarding the establishment of subsidiary corporations by medical corporations for the purpose of conducting ancillary businesses and the expansion of such ancillary businesses might affect patients, medical institutions, and investors. We will also review the issues raised regarding the balance between revitalizing the healthcare industry and maintaining the public nature of healthcare, in the context of the current healthcare system.
In South Korea, the debate surrounding the privatization of healthcare has long centered on the issues of allowing for-profit hospitals and expanding private health insurance. The underlying logic was that, since healthcare services are directly related to the lives and health of the public, medical institutions should not be operated in the same manner as general for-profit enterprises. Even today, the Medical Service Act restricts entities authorized to establish medical institutions to physicians, dentists, Korean medicine practitioners, midwives, the national government, local governments, medical corporations, and nonprofit corporations; furthermore, the principle remains that medical corporations and nonprofit corporations that have established medical institutions must not pursue profit when conducting medical services. Consequently, the typical form of for-profit hospital—where a general investor injects capital into a hospital and receives dividends from the profits generated by the hospital’s medical operations—is not permitted as a standard hospital model under South Korea’s healthcare system.
Against this institutional backdrop, the 4th Investment Promotion Measures, announced in December 2013, proposed—as one of the measures to promote investment and growth in the healthcare services industry—the establishment of subsidiaries by medical corporations for ancillary business purposes and the expansion of the scope of such ancillary businesses. At the time, the government explained that this would diversify the funding sources for medical corporations, enhance management efficiency, and promote convergence between healthcare and tourism, research and development, and healthcare-related industries. In particular, the issue of equity—namely, that medical corporations have a more limited scope of revenue-generating activities compared to university hospitals operated by educational foundations—was cited as a basis for advancing the policy. On the other hand, critics of this policy argued that if medical institutions actively engage in revenue-generating activities outside of patient care, their operational focus might shift from treating patients to generating profits, and it would be difficult to assume that the benefits would be distributed evenly among all patients and small-to-medium-sized hospitals.
A particularly contentious aspect of the 4th Investment Revitalization Plan was the measure allowing medical corporations to establish subsidiary corporations for the purpose of conducting ancillary businesses. The government outlined a policy to enable medical corporations to utilize external capital and professional management capabilities to engage in medical-related businesses such as medical tourism, research and development, and lodging. Subsequently, in 2014, the Enforcement Rules of the Medical Service Act were amended, expanding the scope of ancillary businesses that medical corporations are permitted to conduct. Currently, according to the Medical Service Act and its Enforcement Rules, medical corporations may operate medical professional training programs, medical research facilities, elderly healthcare and welfare facilities, funeral homes, and parking lots. Within certain limits, they may also engage in ancillary businesses such as restaurants, retail businesses (including convenience stores and bookstores), postpartum care services, public bathhouses, medical device rental and sales, lodging services, travel agencies, services to attract foreign patients, sports facilities, and businesses related to assistive devices for people with disabilities. However, these ancillary businesses must be conducted within the scope permitted by the Medical Service Act, and regulations require that the accounting for profits from ancillary businesses be kept separate from the medical corporation’s other financial records.
However, the fact that medical corporations remain nonprofit entities does not, in and of itself, resolve the controversy surrounding the expansion of subsidiary corporations and ancillary businesses. At the time, the government explained that the nonprofit nature of hospitals operated by medical corporations would remain intact, and that subsidiary corporations were merely a means to efficiently carry out the ancillary businesses permitted to medical corporations. In fact, medical corporations are still subject to the principle prohibiting the pursuit of profit. On the other hand, critics pointed out that if a medical corporation is economically closely linked to a separate entity engaged in for-profit business, it becomes a critical issue whether the profitability of the subsidiary and the clinical decision-making of the parent hospital can realistically be completely separated. Therefore, regardless of whether this policy directly permitted for-profit hospitals under the law, the extent to which for-profit motives could expand in the operation of medical institutions was a central issue in the debate over the privatization of healthcare at the time.
The first concern raised was that the subsidiary’s pursuit of profit, when linked to the parent hospital’s medical care, could potentially affect patients’ out-of-pocket medical expenses. The government explained that since medical fees covered by health insurance are determined according to the National Health Insurance fee schedule, the establishment of a subsidiary would not result in arbitrary increases in health insurance-covered medical fees. It also argued that if profits generated from ancillary businesses improved the financial conditions of medical institutions, this could contribute to the stable supply of medical services in the long term. However, opponents raised concerns that medical institutions might focus more on highly profitable non-covered treatments or medical-related products and services. They argued that even if it were difficult to freely raise health insurance treatment fees, the revenue structure of medical institutions could still change by expanding areas not covered by health insurance or by expanding ancillary businesses linked to medical services.
While attributing hospitals’ financial difficulties solely to “low medical fees” fails to adequately reflect the current complex healthcare environment, the issue of inadequate compensation for certain medical procedures—including essential medical care—relative to the manpower and risk involved continues to be addressed at the policy level. The government is also pushing to reform the reimbursement system by focusing on raising undervalued fees in essential medical care and adjusting imbalances in the existing fee-for-service system. Therefore, to resolve hospitals’ financial difficulties, it is necessary to examine various issues collectively—such as the adequacy of medical fees, reimbursement for essential medical care, the healthcare delivery system, and support for regional healthcare—rather than merely discussing the expansion of ancillary businesses. This is because the establishment of subsidiaries or the expansion of ancillary businesses is not a means to resolve these structural problems themselves.
The management system for non-covered medical services has also changed significantly since then. Currently, medical services covered by health insurance are divided into the National Health Insurance Service’s share and the patient’s statutory copayment, whereas the cost of non-covered medical services—those not covered by health insurance—is, in principle, borne by the patient. Even for ultrasound examinations, coverage under health insurance is not determined uniformly in all cases; rather, it depends on whether the examination meets established coverage criteria, such as the specific condition and the purpose of the test. Furthermore, the system for medical institutions to report and disclose costs for non-covered treatments has been expanded, strengthening the management and transparency of such services. Nevertheless, since patients inevitably have more limited information about diseases and treatment methods compared to healthcare professionals, the question of which tests medical institutions recommend and which treatments they select remains a critical issue. Concerns have been raised that if the profits of medical institutions or their subsidiaries are directly linked to the use of specific medical services, this could lead to an increase in unnecessary tests or non-covered treatments. Conversely, one should not assume that actual over-treatment occurs merely because of this possibility; it is important to manage conflicts of interest through appropriate treatment standards, information disclosure, and oversight systems.
Furthermore, there have been concerns that if medical institutions focus excessively on generating revenue through the ancillary businesses of their subsidiaries, this could affect the original purpose of medical services and research priorities. The government expected that medical corporations’ subsidiaries could revitalize medical-related industries, such as research and development of pharmaceuticals and medical devices. The fact that the infusion of external capital and professional management capabilities into research and development could potentially accelerate technological development and commercialization can be cited as an advantage of this policy. On the other hand, fields requiring a long time and substantial costs—such as new drug development, translational research, clinical research, and research on rare and intractable diseases—are unlikely to yield short-term profits. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the mere existence of subsidiaries will automatically increase socially necessary research investment. Both the possibility that capital will concentrate on sectors capable of generating short-term profits and the potential for expanded long-term R&D investment must be considered.
The government, too, took these concerns into account and announced at the time that it would impose various restrictions on the establishment and operation of subsidiary corporations. The guidelines established in 2014 stipulated that medical corporations meeting certain public interest requirements could establish subsidiary corporations and required medical corporations to hold a minimum level of voting shares to ensure they could effectively manage the subsidiary’s business operations. At the same time, the guidelines capped the amount a medical corporation could invest in a subsidiary at 30% of its net assets and introduced safeguards to prevent unfair internal transactions between the medical corporation and the subsidiary, as well as guarantees for the subsidiary’s debts. The requirements for public-interest corporations in effect at the time also included a condition that a significant portion of operating income be used directly for public-interest projects. These measures were intended to prevent the excessive transfer of medical corporations’ assets to their subsidiaries or situations where medical institutions rely too heavily on for-profit activities rather than their original medical purposes.
However, the mere existence of regulations and their actual ability to completely prevent conflicts of interest are two separate issues. This is because, even if a medical corporation and its subsidiary are legally separate, capital and business relationships may still exist between the two organizations. If external investors participate in a subsidiary, they generally expect a return on their investment; conversely, medical corporations must maintain their public interest mission and the nonprofit nature of medical institutions. When these two objectives conflict, the key issues become: to what extent should the subsidiary’s profits be distributed to investors; how should transactions between the parent hospital and the subsidiary be managed; and what oversight mechanisms should be established to ensure that the subsidiary’s pursuit of profit does not affect the course of medical treatment. Therefore, when evaluating the subsidiary corporation system, one must examine not only the existence of the subsidiary corporation itself but also specific institutional designs, such as separate accounting, regulations on internal transactions, capital contribution limits, and the supervisory capacity of regulatory agencies.
The second issue raised is whether the establishment of subsidiary corporations and the expansion of ancillary businesses can actually resolve the financial difficulties faced by small and medium-sized hospitals. At the time, the government stated its intention to improve the operating conditions of medical corporations—which, unlike university hospitals operated by school foundations, had been subject to restrictions on profit-generating activities—and, in particular, to enable small, medium, and mid-sized medical corporations to secure new business opportunities. However, establishing subsidiary corporations, attracting external investors, and pursuing new businesses such as medical tourism or research and development require a certain level of capital, human resources, and business capabilities. Medical institutions that already possess a brand, patient base, capital, and specialized personnel may be better positioned to capitalize on new business opportunities than small and medium-sized hospitals, which often struggle to meet these conditions. At the time, the 4th Investment Revitalization Measures also included a plan to establish a legal basis allowing medical corporations to merge with other medical corporations for the purpose of streamlining operations. However, this was merely a policy implementation plan announced at the time, and it is important to distinguish between the announced plan and the system that was subsequently enacted into law.
This discussion is also linked to issues of regional healthcare. This is because if patients and medical resources become concentrated in large medical institutions, making it difficult for small and medium-sized regional hospitals to operate, access to medical care for residents in rural or medically underserved areas could decline. Conversely, if small and medium-sized medical corporations can secure new revenue streams through subsidiary corporations and ancillary businesses and reinvest those profits into medical services, this could help stabilize the operations of regional hospitals. Ultimately, what matters is not predetermining the likelihood of one scenario or the other, but verifying the actual effectiveness of the policy. The fact that the government is currently pursuing measures to strengthen essential regional healthcare—such as supporting regional secondary hospitals, expanding compensation for essential medical services, and establishing cooperative systems among medical institutions—also demonstrates that these structural problems cannot be resolved by subsidiary corporations or ancillary businesses alone.
Ultimately, it is difficult to categorize the policies promoting the expansion of subsidiary corporations and ancillary businesses for medical corporations—as outlined in the 4th Investment Revitalization Plan—simply as a policy to revitalize the medical industry or as a policy for the privatization of healthcare. The government has explained that these policies are intended to improve the operational efficiency of medical corporations and stimulate new investment and medical-related industries, while critics have expressed concern that the expansion of profit-seeking motives within medical institutions could lead to increased patient burdens, an expansion of non-covered services, market restructuring centered on large hospitals, and a weakening of the public nature of healthcare. Currently, while medical corporations remain subject to the principle of non-profit status and regulations prohibiting the pursuit of profit, the scope of ancillary businesses they are permitted to engage in has broadened compared to the past. Therefore, when evaluating this policy, it is crucial not only to examine whether healthcare spending or the size of the industry has increased but also to consider how patient access to care, the appropriateness of treatment, the sustainability of regional healthcare and small-to-medium-sized hospitals, and the management of conflicts of interest between medical institutions and their subsidiaries are being addressed in the process. Unlike ordinary commodities, healthcare services are directly linked to the lives and health of the public. Even if industry revitalization and expanded investment are necessary, the core of this debate lies in whether the institutional mechanisms designed to protect the public nature of healthcare and patients’ rights are actually functioning effectively throughout the process.