In this blog post, we examine the potential and limitations of the concept of predicting and preventing crime through the brain and biological risk factors, using three futuristic thought experiments proposed by neurocriminologist Adrian Lane: the Lombroso Program, the National Child Screening Program (NCSP), and the Parental Licensing System.
- Introduction
- The Lombroso Program: Can We Detain People Before a Crime Is Committed?
- NCSP: Can Crime Be Prevented by Identifying Risks in Early Childhood?
- A “Minority Report”-Style Parenting License System: What If the State Vetted People’s Eligibility to Be Parents?
- The purpose of crime prediction is not to “identify criminals”
Introduction
“Some people are born criminals.” Taken literally, this statement sounds as if a person’s fate is determined at the moment of birth. However, the question posed by neurocriminology is slightly different: Can crime and violence be explained solely by social environment, or do biological factors—such as brain development and function, genetic traits, and physiological states—also exert a certain influence?
In ‘The Anatomy of Violence’, Adrian Lane focuses on exploring this second possibility. In fact, early brain imaging studies conducted by Lane and his colleagues showed that some groups of individuals on trial for murder exhibited lower glucose metabolism in areas such as the prefrontal cortex compared to a control group. The prefrontal cortex is an area associated with impulse control, decision-making, and behavioral regulation. Subsequent studies have also continued to report associations between aggression or antisocial behavior and structural and functional differences in certain brain regions.
However, we must distinguish between “association” and “determinism.” People with specific brain characteristics do not necessarily commit crimes, nor can we accurately predict that an individual will commit a crime in the future based solely on brain imaging. Violence arises from the interaction of various factors—including an individual’s biological characteristics, upbringing, family relationships, peer groups, economic conditions, and community environment. The World Health Organization (WHO) also describes violence as a phenomenon resulting from the combined effects of factors at the individual, relational, community, and societal levels.
Nevertheless, what should we do if an era arrives in which we can measure these risk factors far more accurately than we can today? Rather than punishing people after a crime has occurred, wouldn’t it be possible to reduce harm by identifying risks and providing treatment before a crime takes place? To push this very question to its extreme, Lane imagines three institutional frameworks for a future society.
The Lombroso Program: Can We Detain People Before a Crime Is Committed?
The first is the “Lombroso Program.” Although the name is derived from the 19th-century criminologist Cesare Lombroso, the system proposed by Lane is not an actual policy currently in effect but rather a thought experiment based on a hypothetical future society.
In this society, men above a certain age must register at a hospital to undergo brain imaging and biological testing. Future technology combines various data—including brain structure and activity, neural network connectivity, and the brain’s chemical state—to calculate the risk of future violent crime. If the test results classify an individual as “Lombroso Positive (LP),” a high-risk group, they become subject to preventive detention even if they have not yet committed a crime.
The most striking feature of this concept is its emphasis on prevention and treatment rather than punishment. Unlike conventional prisons, detention facilities are designed to ensure basic necessities of life—such as education, recreational activities, and the maintenance of family relationships—to the greatest extent possible. Furthermore, risk status is not fixed. Since risk levels can decrease due to treatment, changes in environment, and aging, individuals are regularly reevaluated; if their risk is deemed sufficiently low, they can be reintegrated into society.
The merits of this concept are clear. It does not treat crime solely as a matter of moral evil but views it as a problem of risk factors that can be treated or altered. In fact, the approach of preventing violence from a public health perspective is not an unfamiliar concept even today. This is because reducing risk factors and intervening early to prevent harm from occurring is just as important as punishing perpetrators after violence has occurred.
The problem lies in “determining who should be deemed a dangerous person.” No screening test is perfect. For example, even if a test with a high degree of predictive accuracy were to emerge, there would inevitably be cases where individuals who will not actually commit a crime are mistakenly classified as high-risk. If such a person were detained before committing a crime, the state would be punishing “potential” rather than “actual” behavior.
Moreover, current neuroscience is not capable of accurately predicting an individual’s violent criminal behavior to the extent necessary to justify such a system. While some studies have reported a statistical correlation between brain activity and recidivism, applying the average differences observed in a research group directly to an individual’s future behavior is a separate issue. This is because even people with the same risk factors can lead vastly different lives.
Ultimately, the Lombroso Program reveals an intriguing paradox: the more we seek to prevent crime and protect potential victims, the greater the risk of infringing on the freedoms of citizens who have not yet committed a crime. Advances in predictive technology do not automatically resolve this ethical dilemma.
NCSP: Can Crime Be Prevented by Identifying Risks in Early Childhood?
The second thought experiment is the “National Child Screening Program (NCSP).” This program extends the logic of the Lombroso Program to a younger age group.
Under this proposal, 10-year-old children would undergo assessments covering medical, psychological, social, and behavioral domains. The goal is not to stigmatize children as “future criminals,” but to identify and treat early on risk factors—such as difficulty regulating emotions or severe antisocial behavior—that could lead to future problems. Children assessed as high-risk would receive interventions, including intensive residential treatment.
The principle of early intervention is quite compelling. Providing necessary treatment, education, and family support during childhood—rather than neglecting serious behavioral problems in childhood and then punishing the individual for committing crimes as an adult—can be beneficial for both the individual and society. In actual violence prevention efforts as well, methods that reduce risk factors early on—such as parental support, social skills and emotional regulation training, and school-based prevention programs—are given significant attention.
However, the situation changes the moment the NCSP shifts from “support” to “screening and compulsory placement.” If a ten-year-old child is labeled as “high-risk,” that assessment result can define the child’s identity. Schools and those around the child are likely to view the child not based on actual behavior, but as “a child who might commit violence someday.” Even after returning to the community following a long-term stay in a facility for treatment, the stigma may persist.
The inaccuracy of predictions itself is an even more serious issue. The brains and behaviors of children and adolescents are constantly developing. The presence of risk factors does not necessarily imply future criminal behavior. A child’s developmental trajectory can change simply due to shifts in their home environment, encounters with supportive teachers, or changes in peer relationships. Identifying risk early is entirely different from determining a child’s future.
Therefore, the core issue with the NCSP lies not so much in the necessity of early intervention itself, but rather in how that intervention is carried out. Providing treatment, education, and family support to a child identified as at risk can serve as prevention; however, if freedom is deprived based on uncertain predictions, the goal of prevention may actually cause new harm.
Parental decision-making authority is also linked to this issue. To what extent can the state intervene if parents refuse necessary treatment? State intervention may be necessary if there is a clear and serious risk to a child. Currently, South Korea’s child welfare system also allows for the restriction or suspension of parental rights through the courts in cases of serious grounds, such as child abuse. However, this intervention is based on harm that has actually occurred or been specifically confirmed. The standard differs from justifying forced separation based solely on the statistical likelihood of future crimes.
A “Minority Report”-Style Parenting License System: What If the State Vetted People’s Eligibility to Be Parents?
Rain’s thought experiment takes this a step further. Rather than identifying future criminals after they become adults or treating them during childhood, the goal is to prevent children from being placed in dangerous parenting environments in the first place. Taken to its extreme, this logic leads to a “Minority Report”-style parenting license system.
The logic behind a parental licensing system is simple: just as doctors and drivers are required to meet certain qualifications because they can cause significant harm to others, shouldn’t parents—who have a profound impact on a child’s development—also be required to demonstrate a minimum level of parenting competence? Prospective parents would have to study child development and parenting methods and pass specific evaluations to be granted parental qualifications. If a serious risk of child abuse is identified, the state would intervene.
It is not difficult to understand why this idea has emerged. A child cannot choose the family into which they are born. The right to receive a minimum level of care and to be protected from violence is an issue that cannot be treated as less important than a parent’s private choices. South Korea’s current Child Welfare Act also mandates that the best interests of the child be given top priority and includes provisions to restrict parental rights in cases of serious grounds, such as abuse.
Therefore, the idea of educating parents on basic parenting knowledge and skills and providing support to families in need is certainly meaningful. Policies that link parenting education to school education or health and welfare services, and that make it easier to access counseling during pregnancy and child-rearing, can also stem from this same concern.
However, there is a significant difference between “education” and “licensing.” If the state were to grant or revoke the qualification to become a parent, the question arises as to who would set the criteria for determining who is a good parent. We cannot rule out the possibility that characteristics such as economic status, disability, mental health, or family structure might be used as unfair criteria. Furthermore, if brain scans or biological indicators were used to assess the potential for future child abuse, the problems of predictive errors and discrimination that occurred in the Lombroso program would be repeated exactly.
There is indeed a difficult tension between the principle of protecting children’s safety and the freedom of all citizens regarding reproduction and family life. However, we cannot simply abandon either side. What is important is not to deprive people of their rights based solely on abstract future risks, but to intervene in proportion to verifiable harm and the level of support required.
The purpose of crime prediction is not to “identify criminals”
As we follow these three thought experiments, the most important question in neurocriminology becomes clear: If science becomes better at predicting future risks, how should we use that knowledge?
Advances in neuroscience have broadened our perspective on understanding violence. Research shows that brain functions related to impulse control, decision-making, and emotional processing are linked to aggressive behavior. Conversely, it is not sufficient to explain all crime solely through social environment. Human behavior is not determined by a choice between biology and environment; rather, it is the result of the constant interaction between these two factors.
However, this fact does not automatically justify screening for criminals through brain scans. This is because risk factors identified at the population level are not markers that predict an individual’s fate. A high risk means that probabilities have changed, not that the outcome is predetermined.
Therefore, neurocriminology is likely to be most useful not in determining “who will become a criminal,” but in identifying “which risk factors, if reduced, can prevent violence.” By providing treatment to those who struggle with impulse control, supporting children in high-risk upbringings, and helping parents care for their children in a stable environment, the same scientific knowledge can be used to improve lives rather than deprive people of their freedom.
The appeal of ‘Minority Report’ lies in the fantasy of being able to see the future, but the more important question is what we will do once we see it. The same applies to neurocriminology. The key to creating a crime-free society may not lie in preemptively labeling people as criminals. Rather, it may lie in more accurately understanding the biological, psychological, and social conditions that increase the risk of crime, and in providing treatment, education, and social support before that risk translates into actual violence.
We do not have to choose between crime prevention and individual freedom. What is needed going forward is neither unconditional faith in predictive technology nor a blanket rejection of biological research itself. It is a matter of establishing standards—through open public discussion about the extent to which we should trust the risks identified by science and how we should intervene—that protect potential victims while also safeguarding the rights of those who have not yet committed a crime. It is precisely at this point that the possibilities and limitations of neurocriminology are simultaneously revealed.