In this blog post, we’ll examine the debate surrounding the value neutrality of science and technology, as well as the social responsibility of researchers.
The movie ‘The Terminator’ is remembered for its iconic line, “I’ll be back,” and the image of Arnold Schwarzenegger disappearing into the flames with his thumb raised. Despite being a foreign film, it is so widely known in South Korea that it would be difficult to find anyone who hasn’t seen it. The story begins with a scenario in which human society is nearly destroyed by highly advanced artificial intelligence in the future, leading to a war between humans and machines amid a desperate situation. While the idea that artificial intelligence could surpass human capabilities has been raised for a long time, these concerns are now receiving even greater public attention due to the rapid advancement of generative AI and various other AI technologies.
Concerns about the future brought about by technology—not just artificial intelligence—are emerging in various fields. A prime example is gene-editing technology. Gene-editing technology is steadily advancing for various purposes, such as treating diseases and solving food shortages. However, some areas where this technology could be applied—such as editing human genes to select children with desired traits—are ethically difficult to accept. So, can we judge the development of technologies that have the potential to cause such diverse social problems as inherently right or wrong? This is a long-standing and important debate surrounding whether science and technology are value-neutral or subject to value judgments.
To discuss the value neutrality of technology, we must first examine exactly what value neutrality means. The ‘Standard Korean Dictionary’ published by the National Institute of the Korean Language defines value neutrality as “not being biased toward any particular set of values or attitudes.” Furthermore, in ‘Objectivity in the Social Sciences and Social Policy’, Max Weber explained that social scientific theories and interpretations do not, in and of themselves, contain value judgments; rather, value judgments only come into play during the process of formulating social policy based on them. Based on this perspective, this paper defines the value neutrality of technology as “the absence of any values or meanings beyond the inherent functions of technology” and will proceed with the discussion from this definition.
Current discussions surrounding the value neutrality of technology are an extension of past debates on the value neutrality of natural science and knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary to first examine how the value neutrality of knowledge has been understood historically.
Historically, the value neutrality of knowledge can be divided into three major periods. In the natural sciences, common assumptions and interpretive frameworks are generally integrated into a single framework. Thomas Kuhn referred to this interpretive framework of the natural sciences as a “paradigm.” However, in an era when such paradigms had not yet been unified, the discovery of new knowledge could significantly shake existing paradigms and even undermine the authority of specific schools of thought. Consequently, knowledge at that time carried social significance beyond mere facts and often served as the center of value judgments. The story of Pythagoras, who claimed that the world was composed entirely of rational numbers, and the discovery of irrational numbers are frequently cited as prime examples illustrating that knowledge at that time held meaning beyond mere information.
Following the Industrial Revolution, the perception that scientific discoveries significantly improved the quality of human life became widespread. There was a strong belief that new scientific discoveries would lead society in a better direction, and as logical and empirical scientific systems took root, the focus shifted to scientific facts themselves. During this process, the negative consequences that science and technology might bring were largely overlooked; even when problems arose, they were often attributed not to the technology itself but to the individuals or groups who misused it.
However, as time passed, science and technology gradually became more sophisticated, and their influence grew exponentially. As numerous cases demonstrated that the misuse of technology could lead to serious consequences—such as large-scale environmental destruction or massive loss of life—questions began to arise as to whether science and technology could still be viewed as merely value-neutral, as they had been in the past. From this point onward, the focus of the discussion gradually shifted from scientific knowledge itself to the value-neutrality of technology.
So, building on the argument—widely accepted in earlier eras—that scientific knowledge is value-neutral, what is the basis for viewing technological development since the 20th century as value-neutral as well? This position stems from the perspective of Max Weber, as discussed earlier. It holds that scientific theories or knowledge can only be judged as true or false logically and empirically; they cannot be evaluated as good or bad in and of themselves. In other words, it is argued that scientific theories are only imbued with value by political groups or individuals when they are utilized as tools within society to produce specific outcomes.
The position advocating for the value neutrality of technology follows the same line of reasoning. It holds that the technology developed by researchers is not, in and of itself, subject to value judgments. Furthermore, the material products created through that technology—such as nuclear weapons—are also not, in and of themselves, subject to value judgments. Their core argument is that value judgments are made only in the actions of users—such as politicians or military personnel—who employ nuclear weapons to harm people.
Conversely, the position that denies the value neutrality of technology can also be explained based on Max Weber’s theory. Weber argued that while scientific knowledge itself is not subject to value judgments, the process of its application within society necessarily involves such judgments. Technology is a sociocultural product created in response to social needs, transcending the mere dimension of “knowledge.” As technology moves from the realm of the natural sciences into society, it inevitably reflects the intentions and purposes of the various actors involved in its development and application. Therefore, technology itself embodies certain intentions, and in this sense, it can be subject to value judgments.
From another perspective, the value neutrality of technology can be examined through the responsibility of the entities that develop it. Patents are a representative institution that illustrates how modern society views technology. A patent is a system that grants exclusive rights to use a technology for a certain period to recognize the achievements of those who develop new technologies and to guarantee the resulting benefits. In this way, society acknowledges the rights of technology developers regarding their technologies.
With rights come corresponding responsibilities. If we recognize the rights to the benefits derived from technological development but do not hold anyone accountable for the negative consequences that may result from that technology, it becomes difficult to properly regulate the development of dangerous technologies. Furthermore, in modern society, not only those who directly commit a crime but also those who plan or intentionally assist in the crime are held accountable. From this perspective, the argument that, when technology is used for malicious purposes and causes serious harm to society, a certain degree of social responsibility can be attributed not only to the person who directly used it but also to the technology developer—who could have sufficiently foreseen the possibility of such misuse—is persuasive. The very fact of assigning responsibility for technology development demonstrates that technology can be subject to value judgments, and from a social perspective, this assignment of responsibility is fully justified.
Individual researchers might counter this by arguing that they could not have predicted the consequences of the technology at the time they conducted their research. However, this is not much different from a government that permits all citizens to own firearms without sufficient public debate or consideration of potential side effects, and then, when serious social problems arise, makes the excuse, “We didn’t know this would happen.”
It is the responsibility of researchers, as members of society, to give serious thought to and strive to predict the social impact of the technologies they develop. To claim that one’s research is merely a matter of pure academic inquiry and to turn a blind eye to its social impact without such consideration is hardly the attitude of a responsible researcher. According to a well-known anecdote, when a scientist involved in the “Manhattan Project” remarked, “I could not even imagine what it would be used for,” Albert Einstein, upon hearing this, is said to have severely reprimanded him.
Historically, it is difficult to discuss the value neutrality of technology without addressing the value neutrality of science. While the value neutrality of technology is linked to discussions about the value neutrality of science, the two issues do not necessarily lead to the same conclusion. For a long time, the value neutrality of science was largely unquestioned; however, today—as the influence of science and technology has expanded rapidly—the view that technological development cannot exclude value judgments from the perspective of researchers’ social responsibility is gradually gaining traction.
Many of the changes in today’s society are driven by science and technology. As key agents of social change, researchers must constantly reflect on how their research will transform society. Even if their personal value judgments differ from those of society at large, maintaining a stance of taking full responsibility for the technologies they develop is an important duty required of modern scientists and members of society.
