In this blog post, we will look at various philosophical criteria for distinguishing science from pseudoscience, and explore whether parapsychology can be recognized as a science.
Parapsychology is a discipline that deals with paranormal psychological phenomena related to psychic abilities, the spiritual world, spiritual beings, and spiritual powers. Parapsychology, which was not recognized as a science for a long time, was officially recognized in 1969 when the American Association for the Advancement of Science approved the Parapsychological Association as a collaborating organization. However, many scientists considered parapsychology to be a pseudoscience and disapproved of this decision. So, can parapsychology be considered a science? Before that, we need to think about what science is.
The problem of distinguishing science from non-science is called the problem of demarcation in philosophy of science. This problem of demarcation is a major topic in philosophy of science, and it was first discussed by Mach (E. Mach), Poincaré (J. H. Poincare), It was first explored by P. Duhem and others, and later became the subject of research by logical positivists such as L. Wittgenstein, M. Schlick, R. Carnap, and H. Reichenbach. This issue was also a major focus of K. Popper’s methodological reflections on science. Each of the philosophers of science has presented a criterion for distinguishing between science and non-science. Early logical positivists argued for the criterion of “verifiability,” while later logical positivists and logical empiricists described it as “confirmability.” Popper pointed out the problems with these criteria and proposed the criterion of “refutability.”
However, Popper’s criteria were also criticized by scholars of the “new philosophy of science,” including T. S. Kuhn, N. R. Hanson, and P. K. Feyerabend. In this essay, I will criticize the standards of logical positivism, logical empiricism, and counter-empiricism from the perspective of “new philosophy of science,” and I will seek to improve the standards of compartmentalization in philosophy of science by criticizing the compartmentalization standards presented in philosophy of science.
First, logical positivism can be seen as a combination of Comte’s positivism and 20th-century modern logic. Logical positivists accept Mach’s position that modern science is based on direct experience and that scientific theories are derived inductively from observational data. They hold the phenomenological position that scientific inquiry must begin with objective observational data and that all theories must be expressed in an independent, neutral observational language. Logical positivists viewed scientific theories as “deductive systems of scientific propositions” and believed that only scientific propositions had meaning. Therefore, for them, the distinction between science and non-science was the same as the distinction between meaningful propositions and meaningless propositions, and the criterion of significance was considered to be the criterion for distinguishing science from non-science.
They argued for the principle of verification as a criterion of meaningfulness, and through this, they made verifiability the criterion of science and non-science. For a proposition to be considered meaningful, it must be verifiable. Based on this criterion, the logical positivists tried to distinguish between scientific propositions and meaningless propositions, but crucially, verifiable propositions were limited to recorded propositions or observed propositions that could be directly verified with current perception. As a result, not only metaphysical propositions but also various other propositions, such as value philosophy, ethics, and aesthetics, were deemed meaningless and unscientific. In the end, the logical positivists gave up the criterion of definitive verifiability.
The logical empiricists, who emerged after logical positivism, proposed a weakened criterion of “confirmability” instead of definitive verifiability. Confirmability is the view that a proposition has meaning if it can be confirmed to some extent. The logical empiricists attempted to explain the meaning formation of scientific concepts by analyzing the confirmation relationship between scientific laws and the observational sentences that confirm or disprove them.
According to the criterion of confirmability, a proposition is considered to have meaning if it can be confirmed empirically and plausibly. For example, the law of universal gravitation and the laws of thermodynamics can be confirmed as universal propositions under certain conditions. According to this criterion, metaphysical propositions are still considered meaningless. However, metaphysical propositions remain meaningless. This criterion of confirmability attempted to solve the problem faced by the criterion of verifiability of logical positivism, but it ran into a logical problem called the “reverse logic of confirmation.” For example, if there is a hypothesis that “all crows are black,” then a white swan, which is not a crow, would also confirm this hypothesis. This raises questions about the validity of the criteria for confirmation.
Popper criticized the criteria of significance of logical positivism and logical empiricism as not being suitable for distinguishing between science and non-science, and proposed a new criterion: refutability. He argued that verification and confirmation do not secure logical legitimacy based on the inductive scientific view, and proposed refutability as a criterion for distinguishing between pure science and non-science. Popper argued that in order to be recognized as a scientific proposition, it must be capable of being refuted. According to his criteria, metaphysical or pseudo-scientific elements, rather than meaningless ones, are classified as unscientific, and the criterion of refutability is based on the rules of the scientific method (problem, new theory, deduction of proposition, attempt to refute, competition between theories).
Popper’s criterion of falsifiability seems to be an alternative that can solve the problems of logical positivism and logical empiricism, but there remains a prejudice that the basis of scientific observation and the understanding of science in terms of pure logic are still present. These points have been criticized by Koon and Feirevant, among others.
As a result of criticizing the compartmentalization criteria of logical positivism, logical empiricism, and anti-empiricism, it can be confirmed that they are not perfect for the compartmentalization criteria of science and non-science. They have three common problems. First, they assumed pure observation and neutrality independent of scientific theory. Second, they tried to rely only on inductive or deductive rules. Third, they thought that scientific discovery and justification could be distinguished. Due to these problems, the problem of compartmentalization is still unresolved and is causing new debates. However, the division criteria proposed by the compartmentalists did not remain as mere subjects of debate, but led to an attempt to solve the division problem from a historical perspective beyond a methodological perspective.
