In this blog post, I will examine the philosophical and practical debates surrounding the introduction of a volunteer military system and consider whether such a system is truly appropriate given South Korea’s security environment and social conditions.
How did the debate over a volunteer military system begin?
Long ago, candidate Kim Doo-gwan, who ran in the Democratic United Party’s primary, proposed a “volunteer military system” as part of his presidential campaign platform. A volunteer military system is a form of military service that contrasts with conscription; whereas conscription compels citizens to serve for a set period, a volunteer military system involves service based on individual enlistment. Candidate Kim argued that transitioning to a volunteer military system would allow for a 50 percent reduction in military personnel, enabling preemptive disarmament vis-à-vis North Korea to establish a peace regime, and that training professional soldiers would lead to a stronger military. He contended that this would allow young people who do not join the military to serve the nation through activities other than military service and to participate in economic activities, thereby boosting the nation’s GDP.
This proposal sparked numerous debates in the media and among the public. Some who had completed their military service opposed the proposal out of a sense of entitlement to compensation, while others supported it on the grounds that it guarantees freedom of choice. Although there were diverse perspectives, the arguments presented in ‘What Is Justice?’—a book that had previously raised social issues regarding “justice” in South Korea—had a significant influence on the debate.
In ‘What Is Justice?’, Michael Sandel criticized the volunteer military system by citing the conscription situation during the American Civil War as an example. He presented two main reasons for his opposition: first, that poverty or economic disadvantage can limit free choice; and second, that military service should not become a commodity to be traded in the labor market.
Is freedom of choice truly free under a volunteer military system?
Just because freedom of choice is granted, does that mean one can actually make the decision they truly want from among the available options? A volunteer military system can be attractive because it avoids the coercion of conscription. It transforms the issue of military service into a matter of consent. However, some people serving in a volunteer military may dislike military service just as much as those who did not enlist. An examination of South Korea’s non-commissioned officer (NCO) system at the time revealed that many applicants had no choice but to enlist due to difficult family circumstances or limited educational opportunities. Even in situations where free choice is theoretically possible, low income may leave individuals with no alternative but to apply for NCO positions. The difference between conscription and a volunteer army is not that conscription is coercive and a volunteer army is non-coercive, but rather that each employs a different form of coercion. Conscription employs the coercion of the state, while a volunteer army employs the coercion of economic necessity. If people were in similar situations from the outset, serving in the military for pay could be seen as reflecting their preferences rather than limited alternatives; however, in reality, this is often not the case.
The economist Amartya Sen agrees with this view. He argues that before determining economic incentives, it is important to consider the balance of political power—specifically, whether marginalized groups, such as workers or the poor, enjoy the political freedom to receive such incentives. In a context where military service is assigned, the wealthy may have ample opportunity to exercise their right to be exempt from service, while the poor may lack sufficient freedom of choice to do so.
Second, Sandel pointed out that if military service is traded on the labor market, the significance of the civic virtues associated with service could be corrupted or diminished. He argues that once military service becomes a subject of market transactions—and thus open to being converted into a monetary value—it merely provides an opportunity for those who do not fulfill their service to evade responsibility. Rousseau also strongly criticized this in his Social Contract, arguing that when people attempt to substitute public service with money rather than performing it themselves, the downfall of the state is not far off. Criticism extends beyond military service itself to the very notion of social service—such as public service workers or civil defense duties—being traded on the market. Historically, during the Joseon Dynasty, the obligation to serve in the military was fulfilled by paying military cloth (gunpo); as a result, wealthy yangban were exempt from military service, while only commoners and the lower classes were required to participate. This historical precedent has persisted to the present day, leading South Koreans to view defending the nation as a task reserved for those without money.
Since the majority of those fulfilling military service tend to be people with low incomes or limited educational opportunities, society can become stratified into those who serve in the military and those who do not. In such cases, a sense of social discord arises. This discord can also cause significant problems regarding the nature of the military itself. In a situation where the class division in military service becomes entrenched, a distinction is drawn between those who defend the nation and those who are protected by it. Those who are protected pay for that protection, while those who defend the nation are paid to safeguard the rest of the population. Being paid to defend others is not significantly different from the mercenaries of the past. In his seminal work ‘The Prince’, Machiavelli compared the different types of armies that defend a state. He criticized mercenaries, arguing that they have no attachment to the ruler whatsoever and, aside from meager pay, have absolutely no reason or motivation to risk their lives and go to war for the ruler. It is doubtful whether stratified soldiers would be willing to risk their lives to defend those they are supposed to protect if there is an emotional distance between them and the people they are tasked with protecting.
Not only from a philosophical perspective but also when considering the practical realities of South Korea, conscription is actually more rational than a volunteer army system.
Is a volunteer military system feasible given South Korea’s security environment?
The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) analyzed military service systems suitable for South Korea’s specific circumstances based on selection criteria. Externally, because South Korea is a peninsular nation, it has limited room for depth defense; numerous military threats exist in the surrounding region, necessitating the maintenance of a certain size of military force; and, considering the burden of defense spending, the logic presented is that conscription is more rational from a budget-saving perspective. However, South Korea’s current troop structure has changed significantly from the past due to population decline. As of the end of 2022, the Republic of Korea Armed Forces’ standing force stood at approximately 500,000, down from about 600,000 in 2018. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between comparisons of the volunteer and conscription systems based on the troop levels and security environment of 2012 and those based on the current troop structure.
North Korea’s military threat is also not something that can be ignored. Regarding the threat posed by North Korean forces, Candidate Kim expressed the view that, since a significant portion of North Korean troops is utilized for construction labor, their actual capabilities are weaker than they appear. A defining characteristic of the North Korean military is its strength in asymmetric capabilities, particularly in special operations forces. Due to the nature of special operations forces, which can employ guerrilla tactics, even a small number of troops can paralyze the functions of a typical city. Furthermore, research indicates that approximately eight times as many troops would be required to eliminate such forces. At that time, North Korea’s special operations forces were estimated to number about 200,000; based on this figure, reducing South Korea’s troop strength to 300,000 could pose a significant risk. In response, Candidate Kim argues that modern warfare is not a battle of troop numbers, citing the example of the United States, which defeated 1.3 million Iraqi troops with 150,000 U.S. soldiers armed with modern weapons. However, it is said that U.S. military casualties actually increased after the war was officially declared over. This is attributed to the failure to account for the Iraqi military’s guerrilla tactics.
Furthermore, from a cultural perspective, South Korea faces an environment that makes the transition to a volunteer military system difficult. I believe a volunteer military system can only be considered once a solid foundation of national security values, professional ethics, and social values has been established.
During the Imjin War, King Seonjo fled to Sinuiju, leaving his people behind; during the Mongol invasions, the Choi regime relocated the capital to Ganghwa Island; and during the Korean War, Syngman Rhee broadcast a false report, ordered the Han River Bridge to be blown up, and had already left Seoul himself. Amid all this, the people were trampled upon and ignored. The will to survive—so tenaciously preserved—led to a deep-seated distrust of those whom they were supposed to protect, passed down through generations, and an attitude took root in which fleeing in this manner was perceived as perfectly natural, even from the perspective of those being protected.
Thus, from an environmental perspective, South Korea finds itself in a situation where it is difficult to adopt a volunteer military system. Critics of conscription argue that military culture has permeated South Korean society as a whole precisely because of the conscription system. When examined closely, the major problem with conscription in South Korea is not the deprivation of freedom of choice, but rather the public’s perception of the military and the culture that the military has established within the nation.
How should the problems with the conscription system be resolved?
The reality of Korean society is that, even though military service is mandated by law, the country has produced a large number of individuals exempt from service through various forms of corruption and loopholes. Consequently, the public has come to view military service itself as a crucial benchmark of fairness. As a result, our society has naturally developed a culture in which young people who have not served in the military cannot become “adults,” and those who have not completed their military service are not recognized as “citizens.” In effect, the conscription system has become an institutional “rite of passage” for South Korean youth, certifying their status as social adults. Many citizens have experienced the military culture—distorted by Japanese militarism and persisting to this day—within the framework of conscription, and as this culture has taken root throughout society, a tendency to prioritize the group, class, and hierarchy over the individual has become deeply ingrained. Park No-ja has even criticized Korean society as a “giant military state” in light of these conditions.
To foster a healthy culture of conscription, South Korea must urgently reform its military culture and address corruption related to military service. If these issues are resolved, South Korea could create an environment where young people can enlist in the military with pride, even under a conscription system. The following example offers a glimpse of such a future.
In ancient Rome, which once dominated the Mediterranean, defending the nation was considered an honor during its heyday—a responsibility and a right reserved for citizens, not slaves or outcasts. Divided into six classes, Rome denied the “sixth class”—the lowest social stratum—the privilege of defending the nation. Because this tradition was held in such high regard, there was a solid foundation of public support for the defense of the nation. This is not limited to the past. Prince Harry of the United Kingdom, a constitutional monarchy, volunteered for military service and received widespread public support when he was deployed to Afghanistan. In Israel, although a conscription system is in place—similar to South Korea’s—there is a culture where people volunteer for military service to defend their country. Given that such a culture has emerged in countries that, like South Korea, have experienced genocide, it stands to reason that voluntary military service could also be possible in South Korea. If South Korea’s social leaders were to take the lead and enlist in the military, wouldn’t that foster a positive social climate toward military service?
As society becomes increasingly market-oriented, a volunteer military system is often viewed as a global trend. However, if military service becomes a commodity in the market, not only will its meaning be distorted, but it will also raise issues regarding social cohesion. Furthermore, the current reality in South Korea makes it difficult to implement a volunteer military system. Problems such as the military-style culture created by conscription cannot be solved simply by switching to a volunteer system. These are issues that society itself must resolve.
Candidate Kim Doo-gwan may have proposed this policy as a stopgap measure to address the situation at the time, but I believe a volunteer military system is not the right choice from the perspective of the nation’s direction. From both a philosophical and practical standpoint, a volunteer military system is less appropriate than conscription. The problems with conscription can be resolved within the framework of the conscription system itself. To add, the true future of military service lies in a social culture where serving in the military is viewed as an honor—just as it was in ancient Rome. I hope that one day, the Republic of Korea will become a strong nation built upon a strong military.
