In this blog post, we will examine the direction of South Korea’s national promotional policies and the importance of content strategy through the controversy surrounding the “Arariyo, Pyeongchang” promotional video.
On September 27, 2016, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (hereinafter MCST) held the “Arariryo, PyeongChang” dance video contest. This event was intended to generate interest in the upcoming PyeongChang Winter Olympics. At the same time, a promotional video of the same title, “Arariryo, PyeongChang,” was released on YouTube. The intention was to arrange “Arirang,” one of South Korea’s most iconic songs, into a modern dance track to appeal to foreign audiences in an accessible and entertaining way. The promotional video featured famous singers and comedians, as well as members of South Korea’s national curling and short track speed skating teams. Approximately 270 million won was allocated for its production.
Having watched the video, I was deeply disappointed. Public opinion at the time was also filled with expressions of embarrassment and criticism. Setting aside the production costs, it was difficult to even grasp what the video was trying to convey. Although it was said to have been filmed in Pyeongchang and Gangneung, the only scenes that confirmed this were the opening line “Pyeongchang” and a shot of the Pyeongchang tollgate. It would have been just as hard to tell if it had been filmed elsewhere. It was also questionable whether the video had properly achieved its goal of promoting the Winter Olympics. Even the appearances of actual national team athletes did not flow naturally into the narrative. When the Korean-language promotional video was released to the South Korean public, it drew an overwhelming number of negative reactions, far outnumbering the positive ones.
The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism’s response only fueled the controversy. This was because the ministry explained that the video was not an official promotional video and that it was receiving positive reviews from foreigners. However, an examination of the data released at the time revealed that this explanation lacked persuasiveness. While the Facebook page in question had over 200,000 “likes,” the linked English-language promotional video had only about 50,000 views. Furthermore, the majority of those views were concentrated after the controversy had already begun to spread in earnest within South Korea. It was likely that a significant portion of the views came from users who were simply curious about the video. Additionally, contest participants were required to upload their videos to YouTube; however, when I personally checked at the time, there were fewer than 10 entries. Even considering that there was still time remaining until the submission deadline, the response fell far short of expectations, and based solely on the circumstances at the time, it was difficult to evaluate the campaign as a successful promotional effort.
South Korea is a country for which national promotion is of utmost importance. This is because there are limits to achieving sustained growth based solely on the size of the domestic market, and the country relies heavily on foreign sources for most of its natural resources. Given this structure, the South Korean economy is inevitably heavily influenced by overseas markets and international trade. Therefore, national image is also one of the key factors in economic competitiveness. In the “Survey on the Image of Korea Among Major Countries” conducted at the time, some foreigners responded that South Korea brought to mind war, North Korea, and nuclear issues. Although the percentage itself was not high, there have been numerous instances where South Korea’s financial and stock markets were affected whenever military tensions related to North Korea escalated.
Countries around the world are also continuing to compete to enhance their national images. The United States exerts immense cultural influence centered on Hollywood, based on the world’s largest content industry, and Japan has also been highly regarded for its promotional strategies that actively leverage its national brand competitiveness and domestic content, such as anime. The content industries of China, India, and Southeast Asian countries are also expanding rapidly alongside their economic growth. Amid this international competition, if South Korea’s national promotion stagnates, it may gradually lose the attention of overseas consumers and tourists, which could have a significant impact on the country’s competitiveness in the long term.
However, some of the policies pursued at the time by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST)—which plays a central role in South Korea’s national promotion—caused considerable disappointment among the public. The MCST achieved relatively stable results through 2015. In particular, at the 2015 Milan Expo in Italy, the South Korea Pavilion received international acclaim, winning a silver medal and a special award in the exhibition category. However, beginning in 2016, a series of baffling promotional policies emerged. It wasn’t just “Arariryo, Pyeongchang.” When “Pokémon Go” became a global sensation at the time, controversy arose after the government mentioned plans to create a Korean-style version called “Pororo Go.” Ultimately, following sustained public criticism, the plan was shelved.
Why did the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism suddenly veer off course in 2016? When the Park Geun-hye administration took office in 2013, the Ministry established a four-phase plan for cultural prosperity. Phase 1 was the “First Year of Cultural Prosperity,” Phase 2 was “Experiencing Domestic Cultural Prosperity,” Phase 3 was “Integrating Culture into Daily Life,” and the final Phase 4 was “Realizing Cultural Prosperity.” Among these, Phase 3 was scheduled to be implemented from 2015 to 2016. In 2015, participation in the Milan Expo from May to October was set as the primary task, so the policy’s shortcomings were not significantly exposed. However, as 2016 began, various limitations finally began to surface. The core of Phase 3 was cultural convergence. The primary objective was to integrate various forms of cultural content—such as music and video games—with other industries and media. This aligned with the “Creative Economy,” which the government had promoted as a key policy at the time. In line with the Creative Economy policy, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (MCST) also launched various initiatives, establishing a “Cultural Creation Convergence Belt” and setting up “Creative Economy Innovation Centers” across the country.
“Arariyo, Pyeongchang,” which drew public criticism, can also be understood within this policy context. Since 2014, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism had been promoting not only cultural convergence but also the globalization of Arirang as one of its major policy goals. Against this backdrop, “Arariyo, Pyeongchang”—a fusion of Arirang and contemporary music—can be seen as a natural outcome. “Pororo Go” can also be understood in the same context. It was an attempt to combine augmented reality (AR) technology—which was gaining attention as a new industry at the time—with widely recognized content. From the government’s perspective, this kind of convergence was likely viewed as an ideal model. This policy direction influenced the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, ultimately leading to the proposal of ideas such as “Pororo Go.” However, the mere fact of attempting convergence did not guarantee success. The actual results fell far short of expectations. So where did the problem begin?
By examining the “Pororo Go” case, we can understand the reason a bit more clearly. The biggest reason “Pokémon Go” achieved global success was not the augmented reality technology itself, but the “Pokémon” content, which had been beloved for a long time. Pokémon remained a cherished childhood memory for countless people, and augmented reality technology served to allow them to relive those memories in the real world. Ultimately, the technology was merely a means to maximize the value of the content. Simply applying augmented reality technology does not guarantee success. In other words, to achieve cultural development through cultural convergence, the first step—above all else—is to sufficiently cultivate competitive content.
No matter how excellent the content may be, effective promotion is difficult to achieve without clear objectives and direction. An example that was invariably cited for comparison in articles covering “Arariyo, Pyeongchang” was Japan’s Tokyo Olympics promotional video, which was unveiled during the closing ceremony of the 2016 Rio Olympics. Japan actively utilized its own animated characters, which are widely recognized overseas. In particular, the scene where then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appeared on the field dressed as Mario became a major talking point, especially on social media, and received positive reviews from the international press. In contrast, “Arariyo, PyeongChang” failed to garner the expected response despite combining Arirang with the promotion of the PyeongChang Winter Olympics. This was because insufficient consideration was given to the purpose of the promotion, the message to be conveyed, and the target audience. Although various elements were combined, the public ultimately failed to clearly understand what the campaign was trying to convey.
I believe the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism had the potential to achieve much better results even at that time. The “Day of Culture” policy, implemented in 2014, significantly improved public access to culture, and public reception was generally positive. As mentioned earlier, South Korea’s participation in the 2015 Milan Expo also yielded favorable international results. Furthermore, the government clearly recognized the importance of national promotion. Subsequently, the cultural budget continued to expand, and investments in fostering the cultural industry and content production continued. The issue lay not in promotion for the sake of promotion, but in what to showcase and how to do so. Rather than blindly pushing ahead with promotion, we must first cultivate competitive content and then utilize that content for promotion in the most appropriate manner. This is because successful promotion can lead to a virtuous cycle that further enhances the competitiveness of the content.
At the time, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism faced significant criticism amid various controversies. However, there were certainly cases prior to that in which meaningful achievements had been made in the field of national public relations. Therefore, I hope that the issues pointed out in this article were merely temporary errors in policy judgment. If South Korea’s vital national public relations efforts are not swayed by undue external influences or political pressure, but are instead driven by the essence of the content and its long-term competitiveness, they will certainly be able to produce even better results. I hope that my concerns will eventually be seen as nothing more than unfounded fears.
