Can South Korea Phase Out Nuclear Power by 2026?

In this blog post, while acknowledging the risks and limitations of nuclear power, we will examine electricity supply, economic viability, industrial competitiveness, fuel security, and carbon neutrality to explore why it is difficult for South Korea to blanketly phase out nuclear power and what conditions are necessary for its continued use.

 

Introduction

On March 11, 2011, the accident that began at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan brought home the dangers of nuclear power to the world. Following an earthquake that cut off the external power supply, a tsunami destroyed the emergency power and cooling systems. Even after a reactor is shut down, heat continues to be generated from the nuclear fuel for some time, so cooling must be maintained. However, when these functions failed, the nuclear fuel was damaged, and radioactive materials were released into the environment. The impact of the accident did not remain confined within the plant’s perimeter. Residents were forced to leave their homes, and managing contamination and restoring the region remain long-term challenges.
There are clear grounds for anxiety regarding nuclear power. Following the Fukushima accident, Germany accelerated its nuclear phase-out schedule and shut down its last three nuclear reactors on April 15, 2023. However, Germany’s choice is not a one-size-fits-all solution for every country. This is because each country has different electricity demands, industrial structures, available resources, and conditions for exchanging electricity with neighboring countries.
In South Korea, nuclear power already accounts for a significant portion of the electricity supply. According to 2024 statistics from the International Atomic Energy Agency, nuclear power accounted for 31.7% of South Korea’s electricity generation. To phase out a power source that accounts for about one-third of electricity consumption, we must explain what will replace it, by when, and at what cost. There are many issues to consider between the judgment that nuclear power is dangerous and the judgment that phasing it out is safer and more beneficial overall.

 

The discussion must begin by acknowledging the risks

The lesson from the Fukushima accident is that we must not be overly optimistic about nuclear safety. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s 2015 accident report emphasized the importance of preparedness for extreme natural disasters and scenarios where multiple safety functions fail simultaneously. Even if multiple emergency generators are installed, it is difficult to consider this sufficient preparation if they all become inoperable due to the same flooding. It is not only the number of safety systems that matters, but also whether they can operate independently in the event of different causes of failure.
Therefore, nuclear power plant safety cannot be ensured by design and equipment alone. It requires an organizational culture where operators do not conceal abnormal signs, regulation that is independent of the operator’s interests, and a resident evacuation plan that can actually be implemented—all working in tandem. The fact that safety standards have been strengthened does not mean the possibility of an accident has disappeared. When utilizing nuclear power, we must continue to consider the fact that, even if accidents occur rarely, the damage can be significant, in addition to making efforts to reduce the likelihood of accidents.
Spent nuclear fuel is another unavoidable challenge. Fuel removed from a reactor emits strong radiation and heat even after it is no longer used for power generation, so it must be safely cooled and stored. In the long term, a disposal system is needed to isolate radioactive materials so they do not affect people or the environment. This entails a responsibility that extends far beyond the period during which the power plant generated electricity.
South Korea established a legal framework through the “Special Act on the Management of High-Level Radioactive Waste,” enacted in 2025, to address site selection and construction of management facilities, as well as local support. However, enacting the law and securing disposal facilities are two distinct stages. The process of actually selecting a site, verifying its safety, and gaining the trust of local residents still lies ahead. To advocate for the benefits of nuclear power, one must also accept the costs and responsibilities associated with waste management.

 

Electricity supply must be considered in terms of both generation volume and timing

The first reason South Korea finds it difficult to easily abandon nuclear power lies in its role in supplying large-scale electricity over the long term. South Korea’s power grid is not connected to those of neighboring countries. Since it is difficult to respond to electricity shortages by importing large quantities from neighboring countries, the balance between electricity demand and supply must be maintained within South Korea’s own power system.
The International Energy Agency’s “Korea 2025” report explains that to meet rising demand from the electrification of industry, transportation, and buildings, as well as from data centers, investments must be made in diverse power generation sources and a reliable power grid. Electrification refers to replacing the direct use of fossil fuels—such as in vehicle fuel or building heating—with electricity. Even with improved energy efficiency, electricity demand may rise as the role of electricity expands. However, since the pace and scale of this increase depend on industrial investment, technological advancements, and efficiency improvements, these projections should not be treated as a fixed future.
What matters here is not just the total amount of electricity generated in a year. Electricity must be supplied to the right place at the right time. Solar power generates electricity only when the sun is shining, and wind power’s output varies depending on wind speed. Therefore, simply increasing the annual generation capacity of solar and wind power to match that of nuclear power plants will not solve the supply problem across all time periods. This requires a combination of technologies, including devices that store and release electricity, transmission grids that move power between regions, and demand management to adjust electricity usage patterns.
These characteristics are not a reason to abandon the expansion of renewable energy but rather a reason to transform the power system alongside it. The International Energy Agency’s 2024 report, “Integrating Solar and Wind,” also explains that as the share of solar and wind power increases, the ability to respond to fluctuations in power generation becomes increasingly important. Batteries and pumped-storage hydropower store excess electricity and supply it when there is a shortage, while demand management shifts some electricity consumption to times when supply is abundant. The combination of measures required varies depending on national and regional conditions.
Nuclear power, too, does not always guarantee a constant output. Operations can be halted due to maintenance, fuel replacement, or unexpected breakdowns. According to RTE, France’s transmission system operator, nuclear power accounted for 68.1% of electricity generation on the French mainland in 2025. However, in 2022, a combination of corrosion issues at nuclear plants and maintenance delays led to a significant drop in generation, causing France to become a net importer of electricity. France’s experience demonstrates not only that nuclear power can be utilized on a large scale but also that preparations must be made for situations where multiple nuclear plants simultaneously reduce their output.
Ultimately, the value of nuclear power must be evaluated alongside other power sources. While nuclear power plants exhibit relatively little fluctuation in output due to weather conditions and can supply large-scale electricity, constructing new plants takes a long time. They are not a means to immediately address an electricity shortage as it arises. The safe operation of existing nuclear plants, the expansion of renewable energy, the expansion of the power grid and storage facilities, and efficiency improvements must each be pursued at the appropriate time.

 

Economic viability must be compared under the same conditions

Electricity is a household living expense and an industrial production cost. If the power supply becomes unstable or costs rise, it could affect the competitiveness of key industries such as semiconductors, steel, chemicals, and batteries. However, this fact alone does not necessarily mean that reducing nuclear power will inevitably cause electricity rates to skyrocket. Electricity rates are influenced not only by the mix of power sources but also by international fuel prices, investments in transmission and distribution networks, electricity market systems, and government rate policies.
When assessing the economic viability of nuclear power, it is essential to distinguish between the costs of operating existing nuclear power plants and the costs of building new ones. Existing plants can supply electricity for a long time, provided they meet safety requirements. In contrast, new nuclear power plants require massive initial investments and involve lengthy construction periods. If construction is delayed, interest and various other costs accumulate before electricity can be sold. When discussing the economic viability of nuclear power, the International Energy Agency emphasizes the importance of construction schedules, cost management, and financing terms.
Assessments of renewable energy must also reflect the changing reality. It is inappropriate to simply apply outdated generation cost figures and claim that solar and wind power are always more expensive than nuclear power. According to a report published by the International Renewable Energy Agency in 2025, 91 percent of the large-scale renewable energy facilities commissioned worldwide in 2024 had lower costs than the cheapest new fossil fuel power plants, based on levelized cost of energy (LCOE). LCOE is an indicator that compares the lifetime costs of a power plant—including construction and operation—by dividing them by the amount of electricity generated.
However, this statistic is based on a comparison of new facilities worldwide. It does not mean that all renewable energy projects in South Korea will achieve the same cost or that they are necessarily cheaper than existing nuclear power plants. Furthermore, the cost of generating electricity at a power plant alone cannot account for the total cost of providing a stable supply to consumers. For solar and wind power, factors such as location, grid connection, and storage facilities are crucial, while for nuclear power, construction and financing costs, safety upgrades, waste management, and decommissioning costs are key. A comparison is needed that accounts for all costs without double-counting them.
Therefore, the key question regarding economic viability goes beyond whether a specific power source has the lowest unit cost. We must ask which combination requires the lowest cost to achieve the same level of supply stability and carbon reduction. Since the scale of investment and the timing of returns differ for the continued operation of existing nuclear power plants, the construction of new nuclear power plants, and the expansion of renewable energy and storage facilities, each must be evaluated separately.

 

The competitiveness of the nuclear power industry is both an opportunity and a responsibility

South Korea has accumulated capabilities in various fields—including equipment manufacturing, maintenance, and quality control—through the process of designing, constructing, and operating nuclear power plants. This technology and experience have also led to overseas projects. In June 2025, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power signed a contract to build two new nuclear reactors at the Dukovany plant in the Czech Republic. This demonstrates that the Korean nuclear power industry possesses the competitiveness to secure large-scale projects in the international market.
The scope of the nuclear power industry is not limited to power plant construction alone. During the plant’s operational life, personnel for maintenance and safety management are required, and once operations cease, decommissioning and waste management follow. Small modular reactors (SMRs)—technology aimed at manufacturing and installing reactors smaller than conventional large-scale nuclear power plants in a modular format—are also gaining attention as a new business sector. These areas present opportunities to leverage Korea’s manufacturing capabilities and specialized workforce.
However, winning a contract does not automatically guarantee a profit. Actual results depend on contract terms, construction costs, adherence to schedules, and risk sharing. With small modular reactors as well, it remains to be seen to what extent cost reductions achieved through design, licensing, and mass production can be realized in actual projects. While industrial potential is an important reason to consider nuclear power, it does not serve as a substitute for evaluating the safety and economic viability of individual projects.

 

Uranium Is an Imported Fuel, but It Is Easy to Stockpile

South Korea also sources uranium, the fuel for nuclear power plants, from abroad. Therefore, the claim that using nuclear power would allow the country to completely break free from energy import dependence is incorrect. The advantage of nuclear power in terms of energy security lies not in the fact that fuel is not imported, but in the ability to generate a large amount of energy from a small amount of fuel. Compared to coal or natural gas, the physical volume of fuel required is small, making it easier to prepare for supply disruptions through long-term contracts and stockpiling.
When examining uranium reserves, it is important to verify the estimation criteria used. According to “Uranium 2024,” published in 2025 by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as of January 1, 2023, the world’s proven recoverable uranium resources amounted to approximately 5.9 million metric tons in the category where recovery costs were less than $130 per kilogram of uranium, and approximately 7.9 million metric tons in the category where recovery costs were less than $260 per kilogram. Since allowing for higher costs increases the amount of resources assessed as recoverable, these two figures represent different cost categories.
These figures represent global resource volumes, not the quantities held or secured by the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, the mere existence of resources underground does not guarantee that fuel will be available when needed. The process requires not only mine development, production, and transportation but also the processing of fuel to make it usable in nuclear power plants. In particular, light-water reactor fuel requires an enrichment process to increase the proportion of uranium isotopes used for fission, and supply capacity in this sector is concentrated in a few countries.
In its 2025 Nuclear Energy Report, the International Energy Agency identified the concentration of the uranium production and enrichment markets as a supply chain risk. Therefore, while leveraging uranium’s high energy density and storability, it is essential to diversify both the countries from which it is sourced and the fuel processing routes. Nuclear power is not a means of eliminating fuel supply risks; rather, it is an option that carries risks distinct from those of other energy sources.

 

For carbon neutrality, the magnitude and pace of reductions are crucial

Another reason it is difficult to categorically rule out nuclear power is the nature of its greenhouse gas emissions. Since nuclear power plants do not generate electricity by burning coal or natural gas, they do not directly emit large amounts of carbon dioxide during the power generation process. However, greenhouse gases are generated during uranium mining, fuel fabrication, and the construction and decommissioning of power plants. To be precise, nuclear power is not a completely emission-free energy source, but rather a low-carbon energy source whose total greenhouse gas emissions over its entire life cycle are lower than those of fossil fuel-based power generation. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also recognizes nuclear power as a technology that can contribute to a low-carbon energy system.
South Korea has set carbon neutrality by 2050 as a national goal and aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2030 compared to the total emissions in 2018. In its 2035 National Greenhouse Gas Reduction Target submitted in 2025, the country proposed a reduction of 53–61% compared to the 2018 net emissions. Net emissions are calculated by subtracting the amount absorbed by forests and other sources from the total amount emitted. Since the two targets differ in how they calculate baseline emissions, one should not simply compare the reduction rates.
Under these circumstances, if nuclear power is scaled back and the resulting power shortfall is filled by fossil fuel-based generation, achieving carbon reduction could become difficult. Conversely, it is also undesirable to delay the expansion of renewable energy and efficiency improvements while merely waiting for new nuclear power plants to be completed. In climate policy, it is important not only to determine how much electricity can be generated with low-carbon methods in the long term but also how much emissions can be reduced in the near term.
Policy figures must also be interpreted by distinguishing their timing and nature. The 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand, finalized in February 2025, projected that by 2038, nuclear power would account for 35.2% of total power generation and renewable energy for 29.2%. While this reflects the plan’s direction at the time—to utilize both nuclear power and renewable energy—it does not represent confirmed results or an unchangeable future. The 2035 National Greenhouse Gas Reduction Target, submitted that same year, set a goal of increasing the share of renewable energy generation to at least 30% by 2035. Long-term plans can be adjusted based on changes in demand, technology, and policy, and their actual implementation must be continuously monitored.

 

We Must Ask About Specific Conditions Rather Than Merely Debating Pros and Cons

Acknowledging the risks of nuclear power is not the same as ruling it out in all circumstances. In South Korea, nuclear power supplies a significant amount of low-carbon electricity and offers advantages in terms of accumulated industrial capabilities and fuel reserves. Replacing this role requires a feasible path that takes into account supply stability, costs, and carbon emissions. This is why the decision to rapidly reduce nuclear power without proper preparation must be viewed with caution.
That said, the necessity of nuclear power does not justify every nuclear power project. We must not continue to operate nuclear power plants whose safety has not been verified, push ahead with new construction while concealing uncertainties regarding costs and schedules, or shift the responsibility for waste management onto future generations and specific regions. A society that reaps the benefits of nuclear power must also shoulder the responsibility of mitigating its risks and bearing the long-term management costs.
The discussion needed in South Korea in 2026 must be more concrete. We must ask: Which nuclear power plants will be operated and under what safety conditions? Can new plants be completed by the time they are needed? How quickly can we expand renewable energy and storage capacity? And how will we secure the power grid and waste management facilities? The answers must be based on verifiable data and the capacity to implement solutions, rather than on preferences regarding energy sources.
The reason unconditional opposition to nuclear power cannot be a sufficient answer is not because the risks are small. It is because the choice to exclude nuclear power also entails responsibilities regarding power supply, costs, and carbon emissions. South Korea’s energy policy must be determined based on such concrete responsibilities: strictly managing the risks of nuclear power while simultaneously expanding renewable energy, the power grid, and storage facilities, and continuously verifying the outcomes of each choice.

 

About the author

Cam Tien

I love things that are gentle and cute. I love dogs, cats, and flowers because they make me happy. I also enjoy eating and traveling to discover new things. Besides that, I like to lie back, take in the scenery, and relax to enjoy life.